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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous work has demonstrated that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information 
about the category of which the stimulus is a member. These biases have been interpreted as 
optimally integrating noisy sensory information with category information. A separate literature 
has demonstrated that cognitive load can lead to biases in social cognition. Here we link the two, 
asking whether delay (Experiment 1) and cognitive load (Experiment 2) affect the extent to 
which observers’ memories for simple line stimuli are affected by category information. We 
found that delay and cognitive load have similar effects: both manipulations increase the weight 
of category information on memory for stimuli. We discuss the broad implications of such 
findings on fields such as eyewitness testimony.  
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Cognitive Load Increases Bias in Estimation 
 
Memory is essential for guiding behavior, yet a large body of research suggests that 
memory exhibits systematic biases. One well-known bias is central tendency, where individuals 
remember stimuli as being more typical of the category of which they are members than they 
actually are (Hollingworth, 1911).  Once considered a perceptual or mnemonic distortion, this 
bias has been reinterpreted as resulting from an adaptive, Bayesian process that reconstructs 
inexact memories by combining them with prior knowledge about categories (Huttenlocher, 
Hedges, & Vevea, 2001). 
Individuals may have their cognitive resources strained when remembering. For example, 
someone recalling a grandchild’s size may be distracted by conversation.  In other disciplines, 
such competing demands have been studied under the rubric of cognitive load. Although 
cognitive load clearly affects complex decision-making, little work has examined how such 
cognitive constraints affect memory for basic sensory information.   Here we examine the how 
cognitive load interacts with the central tendency bias in line length estimation.  
Huttenlocher and colleagues (Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Engebretson 1999; Duffy, 
Huttenlocher, & Crawford, 2007; Duffy, Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Crawford, 2008) have 
explained this bias as resulting from an adaptive process that increases the net accuracy of 
stimulus estimation. In their category adjustment model (CAM), a category is represented as a 
distribution of stimulus values along some dimension, such as size or shape, and a stimulus as a 
fine-grain value along the relevant set of dimensions. Categories typically have lower and upper 
boundaries that represent the smallest or largest possible stimulus size (i.e., the smallest and 
tallest tree), with the center of the category being the most typical member. For most categories, 
this is the running average value of the category (Duffy & Crawford, 2010). Stimuli are encoded 
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as a fine-grain memory along the relevant stimulus dimension with some degree of uncertainty (x 
is about 35 feet tall), and as a member of a category (x is a tree). Upon recall, information from 
both levels is combined in a Bayesian manner to create an estimate of the stimulus, with the 
category information serving as the prior distribution used to adjust for the inexactness of the 
fine-grain memory. The CAM proposed by Huttenlocher and colleagues in similar in spirit to the 
Bayesian models that have been used to explain biases in memory for size estimation (Ashourian 
and Lowenstien, 2011), time perception (Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010) and hue bias (Olkkonen 
and Allred, 2014). 
Because individuals have divergent experiences with trees and other natural categories, 
experimental studies in the laboratory explore the central tendency bias by having people 
inductively learn a new, artificial category of stimuli through a task employing serial 
reproduction.  Most commonly, lines that vary in length are used. In a canonical version of the 
task, participants see a study line briefly. After a delay, participants adjust a test line to match the 
study line. Participants repeat this process with lines that differ in size. The statistical distribution 
of the study line lengths quickly begins to affect behavior.  Participants show a central tendency 
bias in their test adjustments, overestimating shorter lines and underestimating longer lines.  
Bayesian models of such central tendency biases in both line length estimation and other 
domains predicts that increasing uncertainty of the fine grain (sensory) information will lead to 
greater weighting of category (prior) information, thus leading to more pronounced bias toward 
the category prototype.  In principle, numerous factors could increase stimulus uncertainty. One 
such factor is delay length.  Work across a number of domains demonstrates that sensory 
representations become less precise, or more uncertain, over time (for review, see Magnusson 
and Greenlee 1999).  Consistent with this, Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan (1991) found in 
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the spatial domain that memories of location showed more pronounced category bias after a long 
delay than a short one.  Crawford, et al. (2000) showed that with estimates of line length, 
category bias increased when a delay was introduced, whereas bias due to perceptual factors (i.e., 
the Mueller-Llyer illusion) did not.  
In a separate literature, research has examined the effect of cognitive load on decision-
making. Cognitive load manipulations are secondary tasks a person engages in while 
simultaneously completing a task of interest. An extensive literature documents that cognitive 
resources are bounded and constrained, and that increasing cognitive load can compromise 
judgments (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and Warlop, 2011; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Shiv 
& Fedorikhin, 1999; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990; Van den Bos, Peters, 
Bobocel, and Ybema, 2006). Cognitive load increases anchoring effects (Bergman, Ellingsen, 
Johannesson, & Svensson, 2010; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009), limits the ability to 
process information (Gilbert, Pelham and Krull, 1988), decreases self-control (Mann and Ward, 
2007), and decreases strategic behavior in game theory tasks such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(Duffy & Smith, 2014). However, to our knowledge, no study has employed a cognitive load 
task to study the central tendency bias in estimation.  
If cognitive load increases uncertainty in memory, then category (prior) information 
would gain more influence, resulting in more bias in estimates. Although cognitive load has not 
been shown to affect basic perceptual processing, an analogous set of findings in the social 
cognition literature indicates that prior expectations influence judgments more when people are 
under cognitive constraints.  Spontaneous trait inferences are more affected by stereotypes when 
people were required to retain an 8 digit number during the task (Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, 
& van Knippenberg, 2004).   In addition, van Kippenberg, Dijksterhuis & Vermeulen (1999) 
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showed that after reading about a crime, the availability of a negative stereotype affected 
punishment decisions, memory, and assessment of guilt when forced to read at a fast pace (high 
cognitive load), but not when reading at a comfortable pace.    
We examine the effect of cognitive constraints on the degree to which category 
information influences stimulus estimates in two experiments. In the first, we manipulate the 
delay between the initial presentation of a stimulus and its estimation. This form of constraint is 
temporal: longer delays represent a greater constraint than shorter delays. Although this specific 
combination of task and constraint have not previously been examined, similar studies with in 
estimation with other tasks or stimulus domains lead to the strong prediction that increasing 
delay will increase the weight of category information. Second, we manipulate cognitive load by 
asking observers to remember a 2 digit (low load) or 6 digit (high load) number or letter string 
while they simultaneously estimate stimuli. If cognitive load functions like delay to increase the 
fine-grain information, then increasing cognitive load should also increase the effect of category 
information on stimulus estimates.  
Experiment 1: Effect of delay 
Methodology: 
Participants: In this and the following study, undergraduates at Rutgers University (65 total, 40 
females, 25 males) participated to fulfill a course requirement.  
Design and Procedure:  We employed a computer-administered serial reproduction task in 
which participants reproduced lines that varied in length.  On each trial, a horizontal study line 
was presented for 1 second.  After either a short (4 seconds) or long (8 seconds) delay period, a 
test line appeared, and participants were instructed to adjust the test line with a mouse until it 
matched the length of the study stimulus.  Participants pressed enter to indicate satisfaction with 
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their match, and the next trial began. Participants were debriefed at the end of the session. Study 
lines varied in 16-pixel increments from 80-368 pixels and were 5 pixels wide. Participants 
viewed 10 study lines at each of the 19 lengths. Study stimuli were presented in random order.  
The length of the test varied randomly.  Delay was a between-participants variable, so each 
participants experienced either short or long delays.  
Results 
To analyze the data, we first calculated the estimation bias for each study stimulus by 
subtracting the actual length of the study line from the subject’s response. Positive bias thus 
means that participants remembered lines as being longer than they actually were; negative bias 
means that participants remembered lines as being shorter than they actually were. The bias data 
averaged across observers is shown in Figure 1.  Consistent with previous results, participants 
overestimated the length of short lines, and underestimated the length of long lines.  
To investigate the effect of delay on the central tendency bias, we performed a multiple 
regression analysis with dummy variables and compared the intercept and slopes of the two bias 
curves. We tested a two-level mixed effects model, with bias as the outcome variable.  Fixed 
effects included actual length, a dummy variable for condition, the interaction between condition 
and actual length, the starting length of the response line, and the interaction between the starting 
length and condition.  Participant intercepts and slopes were included as random effects.  Table 1 
provides a model comparison summary of the effects of sequentially adding fixed these effects to 
the model. 
If participants adjusted estimates toward central values, the actual line length should 
negatively predict bias. Actual line length did significantly predicted bias (b = -0.291, t(12281) = 
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-14.666, p = 0.0001, 95% CI = [-0.330, -0.252]). Consistent with earlier findings from similar 
tasks, shorter lines were overestimated and longer lines underestimated.   
As we predicted, there was a significant interaction between actual line length and 
condition (b = -0.122, t(12281) = -3.82, p < 0.0001, 95% CI = [-0.185, -0.059]), indicating that 
the slope of the bias curve was steeper in the long delay condition than in the short delay 
condition.  Thus participants gave more weight to the category with longer delays.  
In addition, we examined whether bias was affected by the starting value of the response 
line and if so, whether this effect also increased with delay.  Starting line length also significantly 
predicted bias (b = 0.136, t(12281) = 23.93, p < 0.0001, 95% CI = [0.125, 0.147]). Participants’ 
estimates were correlated with starting line length; that is, when the test line began longer, it also 
ended longer. This effect also interacted significantly with condition (b = 0.020, t(12281) = 2.19, 
p = 0.03, 95% CI = [-0.002, 0.038]), increasing slightly when the delay is longer.  
Discussion 
 The main goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effect of delay on the strength of 
the central tendency bias. Increasing the delay increased the central tendency bias.  This is 
consistent with a Bayesian framework in which stimulus estimates are produced by a 
combination of fine-grain information and category information.  Increasing the delay increases 
the variability of the fine-grain representation, thus causing stimulus estimates to be more 
affected by the category (prior) information. Similar increases in bias with delay have also been 
reported for size (Ashourian and Lowenstein, 2011) and hue estimates (Olkkonen, McCarthy & 
Allred, in press). 
Less predictably, the starting length of the reproduction line also influenced responses. 
This can be termed an anchoring effect. Such effects have not previously been examined in the 
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context of the category adjustment model literature. Most prior studies used a fixed starting 
length that has a single value throughout the entire experiment. This anchoring effect was larger 
with longer delays. This may be due to the fact that the memory of the original stimulus 
degraded so much that the starting length of the reproduction line gets assimilated with the 
memory of the original target line. Alternatively, people may stop adjusting earlier under 
condition of greater delay.  
  
Experiments 2: Cognitive Load Number and Letter Tasks 
Methodology 
Participants: 
        Thirty-five people (20 females, 15 males) participated in the number task, and thirty three 
people (22 females, 11 males) participated the letter task. We discarded participants who failed 
to complete the task (1 participants, letter task) or who achieved less than 50% correct in the high 
load condition (2 participants, letter task) 
Design and Procedure:  
        The estimation task was very similar to Experiment 1, with the following minor 
adjustments.  First, before the onset of the study line, participants viewed a 2-digit (low cognitive 
load) or 6-digit (high cognitive load) number or letter that they were instructed to remember.  
The study stimulus was presented for 1.5 seconds (instead of 1 second), and the delay between 
study and test was always 1.5 seconds (instead of 4 or 8 seconds). After participants indicated 
satisfaction with their match, they were prompted to type in the 2- or 6-digit number or letter.   
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 To create number strings, we used integers. To create letter strings, we drew from the set 
BCFJKLPQSX.  This letter choice prevented English-speakers from grouping letters into words. 
We used both tasks because numbers might be easier to “chunk” than letters.   
To increase statistical power, cognitive load was a within-participants variable.  In order 
to constrain the length of the experimental session to a reasonable time, we decreased the number 
of study lines tested from 19 to 9.  Thus, study lines ranged from 96 to 352 pixels in 32 pixel 
increments. Participants saw each study line 10 times, 5 in the low-load condition, and 5 in the 
high-load condition.  
Results: 
 Bias was calculated as in Experiment 1, and data averaged across observers are plotted 
for the number (Figure 2) and letter (Figure 3) tasks. Inspection of the data reveals a central 
tendency bias in all conditions, and that cognitive load had an effect similar to that of delay, with 
high load condition (solid lines) showing more bias (steeper slope) in both the number (Figure 2) 
and letter (Figure 3) tasks. 
 To statistically evaluate the pattern of results revealed by inspection of the data, we again 
tested a two-level mixed effects model, with cognitive load as condition instead of delay. Tables 
2 (number task) and 3 (letter task) provide parallel model comparison summaries.   
As in Experiment 1, we observed a central tendency bias. This central tendency bias was 
evidenced as the prediction of bias by actual line length (number task:, b = -0.052, t(2885) = -
3.044, p = 0.0024,  95% CI= [-0.085, -0.018]; letter task, b = -0.044, t(2708) = -2.58, p = 0.0099 
(95% CI: [-0.076, -0.012]). Also as in Experiment 1, shorter lines were overestimated and longer 
lines underestimated.  However, the overall magnitude of the bias in Experiment 2 was less than 
in Experiment 1, likely because of the decreased delay. 
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In Figures 2 and 3, the high cognitive line (solid symbols and line) has a steeper slope 
than the low cognitive load line (open symbols, dashed line) indicating that cognitive load 
increased the central tendency bias.  This observation was confirmed by interaction between 
actual line length and condition (number task: b = -0.101, t(2885) = -7.79, p < 0.0001,  95% CI = 
[-0.126, -0.077]; letter task: b = -0.098, t(2708) = -7.321, p < 0.0001,  95% CI = [-0.124, -
0.073]).  Thus it appears that participants give more weight to the category when under higher 
cognitive load.  
As in Experiment 1, responses were anchored by starting length: starting line  
significantly predicted bias (number task: b = 0.046, t(2885) = 5.32, p < 0.0001,  95% CI = [ 
.063, 0.029]; letter task: b = 0.048, t(2708) = 5.497, p < 0.0001, 95% CI = [0.0316, 0.0649]).. 
Thus, participants produced longer length estimates when the starting value was longer.  Unlike 
in Experiment 1, however, we found no interaction between starting line length and load 
condition in either the number or load task (number task: b = .012, t(2885) = 0.99, p = 0.324,  
95% CI = [-0.011, 0.035]; letter task:  b = 0.008, t(2708) = 0.6334, p = 0.526,  95% CI = [-0.016, 
0.032]).  Thus there is no evidence that the anchoring and adjustment effect observed here 
increased when under cognitive load. 
The pattern of results in the number and letter tasks identical, with the single exception 
that in the letter task there was a significant main effect of condition on length, indicating that 
observers overestimate more when under high cognitive load.  This effect is small, however, and 
it affects only the intercept (and not the slope) of the bias line. It is also small compared to the 
other reported effects of central tendency bias and the effect of cognitive load on the size of the 
bias.  
Discussion         
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 In Experiment 2 we again replicated the central tendency bias. In addition, we found that 
high cognitive load, as operationalized by remembering 6 digit strings of numbers or letters, 
functions much like increasing delay: both increase the strength of the central tendency bias.  
Overall, we also observed the anchoring effect, although unlike the anchoring effect in 
Experiment 1, there was no interaction with load.  
General Discussion 
 
 In two Experiments, we have demonstrated that both delay and cognitive load affect how 
people estimate stimuli. Increasing the delay and adding cognitive load increased the central 
tendency bias. Thus, category-level information influenced stimulus estimates more when 
memory or cognitive demands increased.  
 Although a number of studies have found that manipulating memory demands influences 
stimulus estimates (see Greenlee and Magnusson, 1999 for review), this study is to our 
knowledge the first to study this class of estimation biases under conditions of variable delay and 
cognitive load.   The finding that category information affects estimates more under higher 
cognitive load suggests that, like increased delay, cognitive load interferes with the fine grain 
representation of the stimulus.  In addition, this result suggests that activating and applying 
category information in the context of this task may be a relatively automatic process, as it does 
not appear to be compromised by the cognitive load manipulations used here.  Because strong 
conclusions about automaticity cannot be made based only on these experiments, we suggest this 
as a topic for further research.      
 These findings are also the first to show that the starting length of the reproduction line 
influences estimates. Prior studies used a constant starting length of the reproduction line 
(Huttenlocher, et al. 2000, Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Engebretson, 2000) or randomized it 
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without analyzing its effects (Duffy & Crawford, 2010).  Here we find a significant anchoring 
effect in that estimates were biased toward the starting value of the response line, suggesting that 
people did not adjust it quite far enough.  But unlike the central tendency bias, this effect did not 
increase with load. 
 Psychologists and economists are increasingly interested in how social conditions, such 
as poverty, put people under conditions of cognitive constraint that may affect decision making. 
Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao (2014) compared poor and wealthy Americans on the tasks 
measuring fluid intelligence and cognitive control. They found that wealth did not affect 
performance on easy problems, but that poor Americans performed worse on hard problems. The 
effects of cognitive constraint are not only found between-observers: poor rural sugarcane 
farmers in India perform worse on similar cognitive tests before harvest (when they are worried 
about money) than they do after harvest (when they have just been paid). Biological markers 
were not indicative of physical stress; rather, poverty introduces high cognitive load. Thus, one 
direction for future research is to examine the effect of exogenous factors such as poverty or 
culture influence how people rely upon prior knowledge in estimation (Duffy & Kitayama, 
2007).  
The finding that participants use category information more under conditions of high 
cognitive load has implications for eyewitness testimony.. Witnesses to a crime are likely under 
cognitive load due during interrogation due to the cognitive and emotional stress they endure 
(Christiansen, 1992); category (or prior) information may thus have a greater effect on their 
memories. Accurate eyewitness testimony is critical for correctly identifying perpetrators. 
However, if witnesses rely more on categories under these conditions of cognitive constraint, 
they may be more likely to report seeing a category prototype (e.g. this is what typical 
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perpetrators of crimes look like) rather than the specific instance (e.g. this is the perpetrator I 
saw). Thus, high cognitive load may exacerbate negative stereotyping in eyewitness testimony. 
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Table 1: For Experiment 1, Model comparison for linear mixed effects models of bias. Each row 
represents a different linear model. Each successive model adds one more parameter (indicated 
in column 1); the total number of parameters is reflected in the second column (df). Parameters 
were either fixed (F) or random (R ). Column 4 shows the ratio of the log-likelihoods of the fit 
provided by the two models listed in the fourth column. P represents the significance of the 
model calculated using AIC (Akaike, 1974). Briefly, it indicates whether the improvement of the 
model fit justifies the inclusion of the extra parameter.  
 
 
Model df Log ratio Model Comparison P 
Bias     
 1. Intercept Only 2    
 2. Participant (R) 3 279.50 1 vs 2 <0.0001 
 3. Actual length (slope) (F) 4 4088.03 2 vs 3 <0.0001 
 4. Participant Slope (R) 6 606.88 3 vs 4 <0.0001 
 5. Condition (F) 7 0.295 4 vs 5 0.59 
 6. Condition × Actual length (F) 8 13.31 5 vs 6 <0.0001 
 7. Starting size (F) 9 996.79 6 vs. 7 <0.0001 
 8. Staring Size × Condition (F) 10 4.80 7 vs. 8 <0.05 
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Table 2. Model comparison for linear mixed effects models of bias. 
 
 
Model df Log ratio Model Comparison P 
Bias     
 1. Intercept Only 2    
 2. Participant (R) 3 251.08 1 vs 2 <0.0001 
 3. Actual length (slope) (F) 4 214.45 2 vs 3 <0.0001 
 4. Participant Slope (R) 6 96.15 3 vs 4 <0.0001 
 5. Condition (F) 7 0.05 4 vs 5 0.83 
 6. Condition × Actual length (F)  8 60.01 5 vs 6 <0.0001 
 7. Starting size (F) 9 73.59 6 vs. 7 <0.0001 
 8. Staring Size × Condition (F) 10 0.98 7 vs. 8 0.32 
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Table 3. Model comparison for linear mixed effects models of bias. 
 
Model df Log ratio Model Comparison p 
Bias     
 1. Intercept Only 2    
 2. Participant (R) 3 187.98 1 vs 2 <0.0001 
 3. Actual length (slope) (F) 4 165.34 2 vs 3 <0.0001 
 4. Participant Slope (R) 6 80.23 3 vs 4 <0.0001 
 5. Condition (F) 7 3.91 4 vs 5 <0.05 
 6. Condition × Actual length (F)  8 52.95 5 vs 6 <0.0001 
 7. Starting size (F) 9 68.71 6 vs. 7 <0.0001 
 8. Staring Size × Condition (F) 10 0.40 7 vs. 8 0.53 
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Figure 1: Delay affects the magnitude of the central tendency bias. Bias (actual line length 
subtracted from estimated line length) is plotted as a function of stimulus size for short delay 
(open symbols) and long delay (solid symbols) conditions. Data points are averages across all 
trials for all observers. Solid (long delay) and dashed (low-delay) lines are best fit through the 
data. Solid horizontal line represents zero bias, or veridical memory. 
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Figure 2: Cognitive load affects the magnitude of the central tendency bias in the number task. 
Bias (actual line length subtracted from estimated line length) is plotted as a function of stimulus 
size for low load (open symbols) and high load (solid symbols) conditions. Data points are 
averages across all trials for all observers. Solid (long delay) and dashed (low-delay) lines are 
best fit through the data. Solid horizontal line represents zero bias, or veridical memory. 
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Figure 3: Cognitive load affects the magnitude of the central tendency bias in the letter task. Bias 
(actual line length subtracted from estimated line length) is plotted as a function of stimulus size 
for low load (open symbols) and high load (solid symbols) conditions. Data points are averages 
across all trials for all observers. Solid (long delay) and dashed (low-delay) lines are best fit 
through the data. Solid horizontal line represents zero bias, or veridical memory. 
 
 
